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COMMENT
The Legality and Practicality of
Condominium Conversion Moratoriums
MARSHA D. ROSENTHAL*
Condominium conversions have been a source of increasing
concern among Florida apartment dwellers as the number of
available rental units has continued to decline. The author ex-
amines the constitutionality of condominium conversion
moratoriums enacted or proposed by counties and municipali-
ties. She then asks whether moratoriums are a practical solu-
tion to the housing crisis.
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I. THE PROBLEM
The conversion of apartment buildings into condominiums has
created panic in many Florida communities. Emotional outbursts
by tenants and condominium developers fill the news every day.
Tenants accuse converters of throwing them out of their homes
with nowhere to go. Developers argue that local condominium reg-
ulation is destroying their property rights. The battle lines are
drawn, but no one agrees on how to solve the problem.
The vacancy rate in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties
was approximately .05% in November 1979.1 Experts have stated
that a vacancy rate of less than 6% tends to inflate rental rates,
* J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 1980; former Articles & Comments Editor,
University of Miami Law Review; Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, New
York.
1. See DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES AND CONDOMINIUMS, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSIONS
IN FLORIDA: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR BOB GRAHAM 5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
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force persons out of the community, and force others into housing
below their current standards." In 1979, 4,205 apartment units
were converted to the condominium form of ownership in Dade
County,' contributing heavily to a net decrease of 3,672 licensed
apartments.'
Television and newspapers bristle with accounts of people dis-
placed from their rental apartments.5 Such persons have only two
choices: either to purchase their apartments or to seek other rental
housing. By early March 1980, the average used condominium in
Dade County sold for $77,671.6 Mortgage interest rates spiraled to
17% in the spring of 1980 Jthen plateaued at about 141/2 %. De-
spite the discounts offered to apartment dwellers on the purchase
price of their units, many tenants find the units out of their
financial reach, and they must seek other rental housing.
This alternative is fraught with difficulty. Choosing to rent
produces acute problems beyond the inconvenience and cost of
moving. An available apartment is a scarce commodity in most
Florida cities. Even if a prospective tenant is lucky enough to lo-
cate an apartment whose monthly rental he can afford, the land-
lord may require not only the first and the last month's rent and a
security deposit, but also credit references. 8 Moreover, anxiety ac-
companies any relocation, some of it caused by separation from
friends and familiar surroundings. The physical infirmities of many
senior citizens compound these problems.
The City of Miami Beach attempted to curb its housing
crunch by enacting an emergency moratorium on conversions.9 The
moratorium made the conversion of multi-family rental housing to
condominium units unlawful for ninety days. This ordinance and
similar legislation in effect in other cities 0 raise a series of ques-
tions. First, does a local government have the power to enact such
legislation? Condominium developers assert that state regulation
of the subject preempts and conflicts with any local regulation.
The next question is whether, regardless of the sufficiency of gov-
2. Id. at 9.
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Miami Herald, Feb. 3, 1980, § H, at 1, col. 1.
6. Id., Mar. 23, 1980, § H, at 4, col. 4.
7. Id., Apr. 17, 1980, § A, at 14, col. 1.
8. See Fort Lauderdale News West Sun-Sentinel, Feb. 10, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
9. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 80-2197 (Feb. 20, 1980). See also Lauderhill, Fla., Or-
dinance 80-110 (Feb. 25, 1980).
10. See, e.g., Borough of Verona, N.J., Ordinance 15-79 (Aug. 21, 1979).
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ernmental power, such moratorium legislation is constitutional.
Condominium developers might allege that the moratoriums deny
them substantive due process and equal protection of the law, re-
sult in a taking without just compensation, and impair their rights
to contract. Last, if the moratorium is constitutional, is it the prac-
tical solution to the present crisis? This author believes that it is
not.
II. PREEMPTION AND CONFLICT
A. Preemption
Florida courts agree that there is "a peculiar propriety in per-
mitting the inhabitants of a city, through its officials, to determine
what rules are necessary for their own local government."'" Munic-
ipalities, however, have no inherent power to enact local legisla-
tion. Any power the local area possesses derives from the state.'
The State of Florida has given broad home rule powers to its
municipalities. Article VIII of the Florida Constitution states that
"[miunicipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprie-
tary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, per-
form municipal functions and render municipal services, and may
exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise pro-
vided by law. ... 18 "Municipal purposes" is defined in the Mu-
nicipal Home Rule Powers Act, Florida Statutes Chapter 166, as
"any activity or power which may be exercised by the state or its
political subdivisions."' 4 Of course, there are certain exceptions to
this broad municipal power. Under the Municipal Home Rule
Powers Act, a municipality may not pass ordinances on:
(a) The subjects of annexation, merger, and exercise of extrater-
ritorial power, which require general or special law pursuant to
s. 2(c), Art. VIII of the State Constitution;
(b) Any subject expressly prohibited by the Constitution;
(c) Any subject expressly preempted to state or county govern-
ment by the Constitution or by general law; and
(d) Any subject preempted to a county pursuant to a county
charter adopted under the authority of ss. 1(g), 3, and 6(e), Art.
11. State v. Sawyer, 346 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Wilton Manors v. Star-
ling, 121 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960); accord, Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, 393
F. Supp. 557, 586 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (dicta).
12. Merrell v. St. Petersburg, 91 Fla. 858, 109 So. 315 (1926).
13. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b).
14. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(2) (1979).
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VIII of the State Constitution. 5
Moratorium opponents argue that state law preempts local
moratorium ordinances.16 First, they urge that the comprehensive-
ness of the Florida Condominium Act 17 and its amending and sup-
plementing legislation, the Roth Act, 18 implies an intent to "cover
the field." Second, they argue that intent to preempt should be
implied because condominium regulation is of statewide rather
than local concern.19
The first argument breaks down because the Municipal Home
Rule Powers Act20 has eroded the general principle that the state
preempts an area by implicitly covering the field. Before its enact-
ment in 1973, courts resolved any doubt about home rule power
against a city. In City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc.,
the Supreme Court of Florida stated:
Local governments have not been given omnipotence by
home rule provisions or by Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1968
Florida Constitution. "Matters that because of their nature are
inherently reserved for the State alone and among which have
been the master and servant and landlord and tenant relation-
ships, matters of descent, the administration of estates ... and
many other matters of general and statewide significance, are
not proper subjects for local treatment . . .
The Home Rule Powers Act legislatively overruled the Fleetwood
presumption that the legislature, by enacting a statute that lacked
an explicit grant of authority to municipalities to legislate on the
same subject, indicates the intent to preempt any such legislation.
In City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc.,i a 1974 case, the
court applied the Home Rule Powers Act to reverse Fleetwood's
"express authority or preempted" stand and, despite the existence
of a comprehensive, detailed state statute regulating the relations
15. Id. § 166.021(3) (a)-(d).
16. Brief of Appellant at 6-7, Miami Beach v. Rocio Corp., appeal docketed, No. 80-626
(Fla. 3d DCA 1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief] (on file University of Miami Law Review).
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 718.101-.508 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
18. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-3 (codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. ch. 718 (Supp.
1980)). The Roth Act took effect on May 1, 1980. For a more complete discussion of the
Roth Act, see Mursten, Florida's Regulatory Response to Condominium Conversions: The
Roth Act, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1077 (1980).
19. Brief, supra note 16.
20. FLA. STAT. §§ 166.011-.043 (1979).
21. 261 So. 2d 801, 804 (Fla. 1972) (quoting Wagner v. Mayor of New York, 24 N.J. 467,
132 A.2d 794 (1957)).
22. 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974) (per curiam).
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between landlords and tenants,'2 held that a city had the power to
enact a rent control ordinance. The statute did not address rent
control and did not expressly permit or forbid localities from insti-
tuting rent control."
Chapter 718 of the Florida Statutes covers many aspects of
the development, construction, sale, lease, ownership, operation,
and management of residential condominium units. Section 402
specifically mentions conversions: "A developer may create a con-
dominium by converting existing, previously occupied improve-
ments to such ownership by complying with parts I and VI of this
chapter."' 5 Part 1 6 sets forth such subjects as the items to be in-
cluded in the declaration of condominium (§ 718.104), the items to
be included in the "common elements" (§ 718.108), the powers and
responsibilities of the condominium association (§ 718.111), the re-
quired content of the condominium association's by-laws (§
718.112), and the powers of the association (§ 718.114). Part VI"7
specifically regulates conversions, providing some protection for
the tenant who resides in a rental unit that the owner wants to
convert to a condominium. It requires the developer to allow the
lessee to extend the lease up to six months (in some cases, nine
months) from the date the lessee receives notice of the intended
conversion.' A county may extend this six- or nine-month period
for another ninety days if the rental-unit vacancy rate in the
county is three percent or less and the county has findings that
establish "a housing emergency so grave as to constitute a serious
menace to the general public" and the necessity and propriety of
imposing an extension to eliminate it.'9 Once the county adopts
the ninety-day extension, it applies county-wide unless a munici-
pality votes not to have it apply within that municipality's
23. Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 83.40-.63 (1979). The
opinion was per curiam, but a concurring opinion advises that the court was cognizant of the
Act. 305 So. 2d at 768 (Dekle, J., concurring).
24. See also Speer v. Olson, 367 So. 2d 207, 211 (Fla. 1979) (a county may issue general
obligation bonds based on its home rule powers in the absence of a state statute specifically
forbidding it); Broward County v. Fort Lauderdale Christian School, 366 So. 2d 1264 (Fla.
4th DCA 1979) (a county has the home rule power to enact an ordinance requiring a permit
for school cafeterias even though the state statute controlling schools neither prohibits nor
authorizes such a permit).
25. FLA. STAT. § 718.402 (Supp. 1980).
26. Id. §§ 718.101-.126 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
27. Id. §§ 718.604-.622 (Supp. 1980).
28. Id. § 718.606(1)(a) (Supp. 1980).
29. Id. § 718.606(6) (Supp. 1980).
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boundaries.30
Thus, Chapter 718 permits conversions if they are conducted
as specified. Is this instruction on how to convert legally also a
mandate that all developers who are prepared to comply with the
requirements of Part I shall be allowed to convert, subject only to
the possible delays authorized in Part VI? Is it a removal of local
governments' authority to control the time and quantity of conver-
sions? Under the Municipal Home Rule Powers Acts' and City of
Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc.,"2 such preemption would have
to have been made expressly in the statute. "Express" means "di-
rect and unmistakable."'8 For example, certain language within
Florida Statutes Chapter 847, relating to obscene literature, has
been recognized since 19731" as a statement of preemption:
[Ilt is the intent of the Legislature to preempt the field, to the
exclusion of counties and municipalities .... [Ilt is hereby de-
clared that every county ordinance and every municipal ordi-
nance adopted prior to July 1, 1969 and relating to said subject
shall stand abrogated and unenforceable ... and that no
county, municipality or consolidated county-municipal govern-
ment shall have the power to adopt any ordinance relating to
said subject on or after such effective date.85
Had the legislature intended to accomplish another preemption
within a different statute, they surely would have tracked, at least
to some extent, some of the language that had already accom-
plished their purpose. In fact, they did just that in the Florida In-
surance Code:
This state hereby preempts the field of regulating insurers and
their agents and representatives, and no county, city, municipal-
ity, district, school district, or political subdivision shall require
of any insurer, agent, or representative regulated under this
code any authorization, permit, or registration of any kind for
conducting transactions lawful under the authority granted by
the state under this code.86
In 1976, the Attorney General of Florida held that this language
30. Id.
31. FLA. STAT. § 166.02(1) (1979).
32. 305 So. 2d 764.
33. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
34. (1973] FLA. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 388.
35. FLA. STAT. § 847.013(4) (1979).
36. FLA. STAT. § 624.401(3) (1979).
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established preemption.87
No similar language appears in Florida's Condominium Act,38
as amended by the Roth Act. 9 Preemption is never even men-
tioned. Any intent to preempt would have to be implied. Implying
intent would be difficult in light of section 507 of the Condomin-
ium Act,40 which assumes that local bodies have the power to regu-
late condominiums-section 507 merely requires any local legisla-
tion applicable to condominiums to apply equally to all similar
buildings." Implying intent would also be useless in light of the
requirement of the Home Rule Powers Act 42 that preemption be
express, as the court insisted in City of Miami Beach v. Forte
Towers, Inc."
The developers' second argument is that intent to preempt
should be implied because activities pertinent to the condominium
form of ownership are not a local concern. Like the prior preemp-
tion argument, this too is overcome by the requirement of the
Home Rule Powers Act" that preemption be express.
Even assuming that it were not so overcome, the developers'
argument would not be convincing. It is true that some out-of-state
courts have approached preemption by analyzing whether the sub-
ject controlled is of statewide concern or municipal concern.4 ' In
those jurisdictions, if the problem is solely of statewide concern,
local governments remain subject to state law;"6 if the matter is
also of municipal concern, the state cannot foreclose a municipality
from passing an ordinance on the subject.47 Because each munici-
pality in Florida has its own distinct housing problems, condomin-
ium regulation is as much a municipal as a statewide affair. For
instance, as of November 1979, the vacancy rate in Dade County
37. [19761 FLA. Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 428.
38. FLA. STAT. §§ 718.101-.508 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
39. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-3 (codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. ch. 718 (Supp.
1980)).
40. FLA. STAT. § 718.507 (Supp. 1980).
41. It excludes land when the owner has recorded a covenant not to convert to condo-
minium for five years. Id.
42. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (1979).
43. 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974) (per curiam).
44. FLA. STAT. § 166.021 (1979).
45. This is one approach used by the California courts in their analysis of the home rule
powers given by their constitution and statutes. See Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employ-
ees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 315-16, 591 P.2d 1, 12, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 914
(1979); Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969).
46. 1 Cal. 3d at 61-62, 460 P.2d at 140-41, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
47. Id.
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was approximately .05%, compared to a 2.6% rate in Hillsborough
County."8 Approximately one-fourth of the total number of units
converted from rental to condominium in the state during 1979
were located in Dade County.' Miami Beach has an extremely
large concentration of elderly persons 0 and thus faces difficulties
not experienced by other cities in Dade County. Because of these
variations between and within counties, the locality is in the best
position to understand, evaluate, and cure the regional evils cre-
ated by a housing crunch. Thus, localities may persuasively argue
that, even without the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act,"1 the
state cannot foreclose local legislative treatment of a housing crisis.
B. Conflict
Notwithstanding any possibility of preemption, a municipal
ordinance may be struck down if it is in direct con-
flict-"inconsistent"-with a state law.52 The word "inconsistent"
has been given varying definitions by Florida case law." The Su-
preme Court of Florida, in State ex rel. Dade County v. Brau-
tigam,54 construed the word "inconsistent" as used in Article VIII
of the Florida Constitution" as "contradictory in the sense of leg-
islative provisions which cannot coexist.""' Another interpretation
would label as "inconsistent" a requirement that a person violate
one provision "in order to comply with" another. 7 This interpreta-
tion, first stated in Jordan Chapel Freewill Baptist Church v.
48. REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
49. Id.
50. See Brief, supra note 16, at 1-2.
51. FLA. STAT. §§ 166.011-.043 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
52. Boven v. City of St. Petersburg, 73 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1954) (en banc).
53. The definitions of "inconsistent" presented in this section are interpretations of
article VIII of the Florida Constitution. Article VIII addresses only whether a Dade County
ordinance is consistent with existing municipal powers and general law. Therefore, when
determining the constitutionality of any ordinance except a Dade County ordinance, one
may employ the article VIII definitions of "inconsistent" only by analogy. Consideration of
judicial interpretation of article VIII is nonetheless appropriate; the analogy is powerful.
54. 224 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1969).
55. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(f), provides: "[tlo the extent not inconsistent with the
powers of existing municipalities or general law, the Metropolitan Government of Dade
County may exercise all the powers conferred now or hereafter by general law upon munici-
palities." (emphasis added).
56. 224 So. 2d at 692, cited by Scavella v. Fernandez, 371 So. 2d 535, 536 (Fla. 3d DCA
1979).
57. Jordan Chapel Freewill Baptist Church v. Dade County, 334 So. 2d 661, 664 (Fla.
3d DCA 1976).
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Dade County,58 was supposedly a mere restatement by the District
Court of Appeals, Third District, of the earlier definition set forth
in Brautigam.59 Three years later, however, in Scavella v. Fernan-
dez,e0 the Third District said that the two definitions were not in-
terchangeable, and that the second definition was not applicable in
an examination of a statute that vests a right or privilege. When
prohibitory legislation designed merely to establish minimum regu-
lations is involved, however, the Jordan Chapel "no violation" def-
inition is to be applied."
In Scavella, an action was brought against the county to re-
cover damages for personal injury sustained in an automobile acci-
dent caused by a Dade County employee. The district court dis-
missed the action because notice to the county had not been given
"within sixty (60) days after the date of receiving the injury or
damages alleged,"' as required by section 2-2 of the County Code.
Scavella appealed, claiming she had given proper notice well within
the time period allowed by section 768.28(6) of the Florida Stat-
utes. The state law specifies that no action may be instituted
against the state unless notice is given "within three years after
such claim accrues."
es
In striking down the county provision as being in conflict with
the state statute, the court said: "[I]t seems obvious that, under
[the Brautigam] definition, the two provisions in question here
cannot co-exist. ' '" 4 The county relied on the Jordan Chapel inter-
pretation of inconsistency as arising from the necessity of violating
one provision by complying with another, arguing that because one
could comply with both the ordinance and the statute merely by
giving notice within sixty days, the two provisions were not incon-
sistent. The court deemed the county's argument "unsound,"' 5 and
pointed to the difference in the types of legislation involved in Jor-
dan Chapel" and Scavella.
The Jordan Chapel plaintiff challenged the local regulation of
58. Id.
59. 224 So. 2d 688.
60. 371 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
61. See E.B. Elliott Adv. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141, 1150 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 932 (1970).
62. DADE Co., FLA., CODE § 2-2 (1976).
63. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(6) (1979).
64. 371 So. 2d at 536.
65. Id.
66. 334 So. 2d 661. -
67. 371 So. 2d 535.
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bingo playing. The Florida statute governing bingo playing68 per-
mits nonprofit or veterans' organizations to operate bingo games if
the proceeds are donated to the nonprofit or veterans' organiza-
tions for charitable, civic, community, benevolent, religious, or ed-
ucational purposes. 69 If the organization is not established for the
above purpos'es, it may still operate bingo games as long as the
proceeds are returned to the players in the form of prizes. The
statute also specifies the number of times per week the games may
be operated, the maximum size of the jackpot, the persons who
may operate the games, the minimum age required to play the
games, and the places where the games may be played. 70 In addi-
tion to these regulations, the Dade County ordinance required
bingo operators to obtain a valid permit, to disclose certain infor-
mation before receiving a permit, to maintain records on the oper-
ation of the games, to post specified information about the identity
of the charity, and to provide specified types of playing materials."
The court in Jordan Chapel72 reasoned that since the state law
was prohibitive in nature, it merely provided minimum regulations,
allowing for stricter local regulation. Therefore, in order for con-
flict to be deemed to exist between the state statute and any con-
trolling local ordinance, the plaintiff would have to cite "language
in the statute which [could] be deemed a prohibition on additional
stricter regulations by local government agencies. '7 8
Acknowledging both the correct usage of the Jordan Chapel
definition in Jordan Chapel,74 and the correctness of the result,
the court in Scavella7' distinguished the "prohibitory-regulatory"
type of legislation found in Jordan Chapel76 from the "permission-
granting" type of legislation involved in Scavella. In Scavella, the
statute granted the plaintiff permission to act in a certain man-
ner-to file a claim any time within three years; the state did not
forbid anything. The court said that a local ordinance would be in
conflict with such a "permission-granting" statute if it limited the
68. FLA. STAT. §§ 849.01-.46 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 849.01-.46 (1979 &
Supp. 1980)).
69. Id. § 849.093.
70. Id.
71. Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 70-50 (July 2, 1975).
72. 334 So. 2d 661.
73. Id. at 664.
74. 334 So. 2d 661.
75. 371 So. 2d 535.
76. 334 So. 2d 661.
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right granted in any manner." The court relied on the reasoning of
a Louisiana court that said:
When the law of the state provides that it is unlawful for a per-
son under fourteen years of age to drive an automobile on the
highways of the state, it is equivalent to stating that it is lawful
for a person over fourteen years of age to drive an automobile on
the highways of the state, and therefore an ordinance of a mu-
nicipality that attempts to make it unlawful for a person over
fourteen years to drive on the highways ...is in conflict with
the general law, and of no effect.78
The District Court of Appeals, Third District, thus summed up:
"what the legislature hath granted, the commission may not take
away-even in part.'
'1 9
An analysis of whether local condominium conversion
moratoriums conflict with the Florida Condominium Act requires a
threshold determination of whether the Act is "permission-grant-
ing" or "prohibitory." Cases in which the courts have used a
Scavella-like test (for permission-granting ordinances) have in-
volved the right to regulate driving ages, 80 monitor speed limits,8"
and require the issuance of a permit for carrying a concealed fire-
arm. 2 In all of those cases the subject of the legislation was a priv-
ilege granted by the state. There was no right recognized at com-
mon law to drive,83 to use state roads,'4 or to keep and bear
firearms.8 5 Courts have used the kind of interpretation found in
Jordan Chapel (applicable to "prohibitory-regulatory" legislation)
to decide cases involving the regulation of billboard placement8
and bingo playing.87 The legislation in these latter cases is distin-
guishable from that in the first set of cases because the activities
regulated in the latter cases do not owe their legal existence to
legislation.
Thus, unless a statute regulates an activity unknown at com-
77. 371 So. 2d 535.
78. Lowenberg v. Fidelity Union Cas. Co., 147 So. 81, 90 (La. App. 1933) (citing
Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 86, 167 N.E. 158, 160 (1929)).
79. 371 So. 2d at 537.
80. Lowenberg v. Fidelity Union Cas. Co., 147 So. 81 (La. App. 1933).
81. Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
82. Purdy v. Woodward, 369 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (per curiam).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978).
84. See Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
85. 79 AM. JUR. 2d Weapons and Firearms § 4 (1975).
86. E.B. Elliot Adv. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 932 (1970).
87. 334 So. 2d 661.
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mon law, it will be deemed "prohibitory" and the Jordan Chapel
conflict definition should be used. The condominium form of own-
ership was found throughout the country before the passage of any
special legislation.88 Under common law, the selling of a condomin-
ium merely involved the conveyance of title to a portion of a build-
ing.89 In 1962 a condominium in Hallandale, Florida, was the first
in the United States to gain the approval of the Federal Housing
Administration," even though Florida's first condominium legisla-
tion was not passed until 1963.91 The conflict of local condominium
regulation with state regulation will therefore be tested under the
Jordan Chapel definition if analogy is made to judicial interpreta-
tion of "inconsistent" in Article VIII of the Florida Constitution.
Even if the local moratorium legislation is more restrictive than
the state legislation and temporarily forbids conversions although
section 718.402 of the Florida Statutes permits them, there is no
conflict between the ordinance and the statute under the Jordan
Chapel definition of "inconsistent" because compliance with the
local ordinance would not result in a violation of the state statute.
A person could comply with the local law by refraining from con-
verting an apartment building into a condominium. This absten-
tion would not violate any state law.
The opponents of the Miami Beach moratorium might claim
that a local moratorium violates section 718.507 of the Florida
Statutes, which prohibits legislation affecting condominiums unless
it is "equally applicable to all buildings and improvements of the
same kind." 92 The opponents claim that the local moratorium dis-
criminates against the condominium form of ownership and is
therefore in direct conflict with the statute.as Local legislators,
however, can argue that they are not regulating condominiums, but
are placing a restriction on all buildings of a like kind, as is re-
quired by the statute. All multi-family residential buildings are
regulated under the ordinance; condominiums are not singled
88. 1 A. FERRER AND K. STECHER, LAW OF CONDOMINIUM § 53 n.66 (1967); W. LIPPMAN,
CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT 2d 11 (1972).
89. Borgwardt, The Condominium, 36 CAL. ST. B.J. 603 (1961).
90.. Lawyers Title News, June 1962, at 7.
91. FLA. STAT. §§ 711.01-.23 (1963) (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 718.101-.508 (1979
& Supp. 1980)).
92. FLA. STAT. § 718.507 (Supp. 1980). See Brief, supra note 16, at 32-37 (appellee's
position implicit therein). Section 507 now requires equal applicability unless the owner of
the land has recorded a covenant not to convert to condominium for five years.
93. See Brief, supra note 16, at 32-33 (appellee's argument implicit therein).
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out. 4
Regardless of how the preemption question and the conflict
question are eventually resolved, the problems raised call for fur-
ther analysis of moratorium legislation. Even if a locality is pre-
cluded from enacting a moratorium law, the state might decide to
pass similar legislation, in which case constitutional challenges will
arise.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MORATORIUMS
A. Due Process
Developers may challenge moratoriums as allowing a confisca-
tion of property under color of law without due process. They
might allege a right to buy, own, and sell real estate-a right to use
their land in any manner not materially inconsistent with the com-
mon good.
The principle that there exists a natural right to acquire, own,
and deal with property as one chooses as long as the use is not
harmful to others is well established.'8 This right, however, is
subordinate to the state's or municipality's right under its police
power reasonably to regulate the property's use.' To effect a con:
stitutional regulation and not an unconstitutional taking, an exer-
cise of police power must be aimed at securing the general safety,
public welfare, public convenience, or general prosperity.9 7
The Supreme Court has held a housing shortage to be a men-
ace to the health, safety, and general welfare of citizens. Such an
emergency gives rise to a proper exercise of the police power.98 The
Supreme Court, in upholding a New York tenant law, said:
The warrant for this legislative resort to the police power
was the conviction on the part of the state legislators that there
existed in the larger cities of the State a social emergency,
caused by an insufficient supply of dwelling houses and apart-
ments, so grave that it constituted a serious menace to the
health, morality, comfort, and even ... the peace of a large part
94. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 80-2197 (Feb. 20, 1980).
95. 16A AM, JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 397 (1975).
96. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v.
Strong, 300 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1974); William Murray Builders, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 254
So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1971); Eccles v. Stone, 134 Fla. 113, 183 So. 628 (Fla. 1938); Pinellas County
v. Dynamic Inv., Inc., 279 So. 2d 97 (Fla.,2d DCA 1973).
97. See cases cited note 96 supra.
98. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922); Marcus Brown Holding
Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
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of the people of the State. That such an emergency, if it really
existed, would sustain a resort, otherwise valid, to the police
power for the purpose of dealing with it cannot be doubted, for,
unless relieved, the public welfare would suffer in respects which
constitute the primary and undisputed, as well as the most
usual, basis and justification for exercise of that power. 9
The situation in Florida during the past year reached the dimen-
sions of a crisis. 100 A moratorium passed under the state's police
power would, therefore, satisfy the proper purpose requirement.
Once it is established that the purpose of the moratorium falls
within the scope of the state's police power, its validity depends on
whether the regulation is reasonable under the existing circum-
stances.101 The reasonableness of an exercise of police power "var-
ies with circumstances and conditions. 10 2 The court will uphold a
regulation "[i]f the validity of the legislative classification . . . [is]
fairly debatable." 0 8 Under this test, the burden of proving unrea-
sonableness, placed on the moratorium's opponents, is great. They
cannot fulfill this burden; the differences of opinion voiced daily
evidence the debatability of the subject.
It is unlikely that a court would strike down a moratorium on
due process grounds. Governing bodies possess great discretion to
determine which public interests must be protected and which
means are best suited to protect those interests. 04 Using its discre-
tion, a legislating body may determine when conditions exist that
require the exercise of police power to combat a public evil.1 05
Developers might argue that conversion moratoriums deprive
them of their rights while favoring tenants. The county in Rock-
vile Grosvenor, Inc. v. Montgomery County'0" furnishes a way of
attacking this argument. There, a circuit court in Maryland upheld
legislation requiring developers who converted rental housing to
condominiums to give certain displaced low-income tenants the
money required to relocate. The county had analogized the reloca-
tion assistance payments to minimum wage requirements. It noted:
[m]inimum wage laws constitute a regulation which deprives
99. 258 U.S. at 245.
100. See text accompanying notes 1-8 supra.
101. See Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 (1911).
102. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
103. Id. at 388.
104. Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 290 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1974).
105. Newman v. Carson, 280 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1973).
106. No. 68203 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County Aug. 24, 1979), discussed in 20 MUNICIPAL
ATTORNEY 138 (1979).
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employers of "property" in favor of individual persons, employ-
ees, [when] these employers engag[e] in a certain activity, i.e.
employment, much the same as the relocation payment provi-
sions . . . "deprive" an owner of property, in favor of certain
displaced and needy tenants who receive relocation payments,
[when] that owner engag[es] in a regulated activity, i.e. condo-
minium conversion.107
In Miller v. Schoene,'08 petitioners who were required by stat-
ute to cut down a large number of ornamental red cedar trees (be-
cause they bore a disease fatal to nearby apple trees) offered the
same argument as the developers in Rockville Grosvenor. The ap-
ple trees were owned by persons not parties to the case. Despite
the statute's favoring one group at the expense of another, the
Court upheld the action, ruling that the state could make this
choice between competing interests because there was a "prepon-
derant public concern in the preservation of the one interest over
the other." 10 9 The Court noted that "[i]t would have been none the
less a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state,
by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple
orchards within its borders to go on unchecked."110 With a similar
"preponderant public concern," Miami Beach can prefer the inter-
ests of tenants over the interests of the building owners because
the potential injury to the former group is greater than the harm
to the latter.
An Illinois district court in Chicago Real Estate Board v. Chi-
cago"' was convinced that a challenged forty-day moratorium de-
nied developers their due process rights. The district court not
only stated that circumstances that would warrant the deprivation
of the developer's property rights were lacking, but it also doubted
whether there could ever be such a showing." 2 The court drew a
distinction between regulating the rights and suspending them,
stating that regulation of rights, as opposed to suspension, is
permissible.
This distinction, however, appears to be dubious, since every
piece of legislation can be seen as suspending a person's rights. In
107. MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY at 139. The appellee made a similar argument in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 371 (1926). The Court, however, did not discuss
the issue.
108. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
109. Id. at 279.
110. Id.
111. No. 79C (D. I1. Apr. 20, 1979).
112. Id.
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Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,113 the Su-
preme Court of the United States upheld the city's Landmark
Preservation Law despite the fact that it forbade developers from
constructing a high rise building atop the Grand Central Terminal.
The city's ordinance did not regulate the construction of such a
building, but forbade it, thereby suspending the developer's prop-
erty rights. Condominium conversion moratoriums impose less of a
restriction on property rights than does the Landmark Preserva-
tion Law; they suspend rights for only ninety days, while the
Landmark Preservation Law suspends a property right indefi-
nitely. The conversion moratoriums should be upheld on the basis
of Penn Central Transportation Co.
Although developers claim that Miami Beach could have used
a less restrictive alternative to alleviate the housing problem, a reg-
ulation does not violate the due process clause merely because the
problem could have been solved by other, more lenient means. As
long as the means are reasonably related to the end, the judiciary
will refuse to make any further inquiry.1 14
Thus, as long as the moratorium is of limited duration and
keyed to an existing housing crisis, it will likely be upheld as a
proper and reasonable exercise of the state's police powers, over-
coming any due process challenge to the statute.
B. Taking Without Just Compensation
Another challenge to the moratorium legislation, that the stat-
ute or ordinance effects a taking without just compensation, is in-
tertwined with the due process argument.
Governmental action that diminishes the value of someone's
property is not per se an unconstitutional "taking."' 15 Although
tax laws and regulations have an unquestionably adverse affect
upon private economic interests, they are upheld as a legitimate
exercise of police power. Land use regulations have also been up-
held as a legitimate exercise of police power even though they di-
minish recognized property rights. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,"' a zoning change which prohibited industrial use of
113. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
114. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943); see notes 76-80 supra; cf. State ex rel. Schillberg v. Everett Dist. Justice Court, 19
Wash. App. 421, 575 P.2d 1096 (1978) (county ordinance found to violate state's
constitution).
115. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
116. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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the appellee's property was upheld despite an alleged 75% diminu-
tion in the property's value.117
Recently, in Rogin v. Bensalem Township," 8 the United
States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, sustained a zoning regula-
tion notwithstanding a condominium developer's claim that there
was a taking without just compensation. The developer challenged
the Township's retroactive application of an amended zoning ordi-
nance that reduced the permissible number of housing units per
acre from twelve to four. The developer's plan to build a 557-unit
condominium project had been approved by the Township before
the zoning change. The new zoning would permit only 200 units to
be built in the project, resulting in an alleged diminution of one
million dollars ($1,000,000) in the land's market value." 9
The court considered two factors significant in determining
whether an unconstitutional taking had occurred. 12 0 The first fac-
tor considered was the expansiveness of the regulation's applica-
tion. The broader the class of properties affected, the greater the
likelihood of sustaining the ordinance. 12 Applying the first factor,
the court noted that the zoning amendment in question applied to
all landowners in the area, not just the developer. The. breadth of
its application therefore supported the validity of the ordinance.
In Rogin, several types of properties and landowners in one
concentrated area were affected by the legislation. Developers op-
posing a moratorium on condominium conversions might argue
that their case is distinguishable because a moratorium would af-
fect only one class of property owners-condominium
converters. 122
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 2 3 how-
ever, indicates the questionable merit of that distinction. In that
case, the New York City law sustained by the Supreme Court ap-
plied only to selected properties adjudged landmarks. The prop-
erty owners argued that the landmark law related only to selected
parcels and not to all property within a given area (as would a zon-
ing ordinance). The Court stressed the fact that the landmark leg-
islation was part of a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of
117. Id. at 384.
118. 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980).
119. Id. at 692.
120. Id. at 690-91.
121. Id. at 690. See also United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Bevis, 336 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1976).
122. Cf. text accompanying notes 92-94 supra (argument concerning types of property
rather than classifications of property owners).
123. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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historic and aesthetic interest. Although the legislation applied
only to the few properties classified as landmarks, it had applica-
tion throughout a large area and was part of a broad plan. Such
reasoning could be applied to support legislation limiting condo-
minium conversions.
The second factor applied by the Rogin court12 concerned the
diminution in land values resulting from the ordinance. The court
stressed that there had been tolerance of great diminutions in
value in other cases,12 5 and stated that a law should be sustained
unless it "destroys or severely diminishes the value of the prop-
erty." 12 6 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 12 7 the Supreme
Court sustained a zoning law that had allegedly caused a drastic
reduction in the value of the appellee's land.12 8 In another Su-
preme Court case, an alleged 921/2 % diminution in value was not
sufficient to require invalidation of an ordinance forbidding the op-
eration of a brickyard.129 The Rogin court noted that the reduction
in population density required by the ordinance "very likely will
benefit the developer to some extent by making the remaining
units in Bensalem Village [the condominium development] more
desirable."130
The court in Grace v. Town of Brookline31 approached the
"taking" question in a different context. The plaintiffs in Grace
argued that an ordinance prescribing special rules for the eviction
of tenants in buildings being converted to condominiums effected a
taking without just compensation. They argued that the ordinance
did not regulate, but rather involved a "transfer of
rights"-specifically, a transfer of "the right to possess from the
owner to the tenant."13' The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts rejected that argument, analogizing to the line of Supreme
Court decisions that have sustained rent control statutes despite
124. 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980).
125. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Gold-
blatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915).
126. 616 F.2d at 690.
127. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
128. The landowner alleged that the land use limitation would reduce the land's value
from $10,000 per acre to not more than $2,500 per acre and would diminish 200 feet of
frontal footage in value from $150 per foot to $50 per foot. Id. at 384.
129. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915).
130. 616 F.2d at 691.
131. - Mass. -, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979).
132. Id. at -, 399 N.E.2d at 1045.
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their redistribution of economic rights. The court emphasized that
the developer's property was not rendered useless by the legisla-
tion, because the developer would still be entitled to receive rent
until the tenants vacated.
Under the tests set forth in Rogin and Grace, those who op-
pose the moratorium will have to make a compelling showing of
detriment in order to prevail on the "taking" argument. As noted
above, the moratorium is part of a broad plan to deal with a prob-
lem affecting the general public. Sufficient diminution in property
value will be hard to prove. Although the profit resulting from a
conversion is generally much greater than that received by operat-
ing the same building as rental property, any claim by the devel-
oper of a diminution will lose some of its persuasiveness because
the building will still be able to generate rental income.
C. Equal Protection
The constitutional mandate of equal protection of the laws re-
quires that statutes uniformly apply to all persons similarly situ-
ated. " ' Neither the equal protection clause of the federal Constitu-
tion nor the corresponding clause in the Florida Constitution
grants unequivocal equality among all persons.1 8 4
The equal protection challenge will focus on whether the clas-
sification of persons affected by the moratorium has a rational ba-
sis.1" The "rational basis" test requires that there be a reasonable
relation between the statutory classification and the lawful object
of the legislation. " '
The objective of moratorium legislation is the alleviation of
the rental housing shortage. To this end, the legislation applies
only to the conversion to condominiums of housing classified as
multi-family. The legislation does not affect existing condomini-
ums on land upon which there is no multi-family dwelling.137
Apartment owners might assert that there is no rational basis
for this classification. Although conceding that the legislature has
broad discretion to decide what evils to combat and how best to
fight those wrongs, they might claim they are being wrongfully sin-
133. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
134. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Sawyer v.
State, 94 Fla. 60, 113 So. 736 (1927).
135. Landrau v. State, 365 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1978).
136. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Soverino v. State, 356 So. 2d 269 (Fla.
1978).
137. See, e.g., Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 80-2197 (Feb. 20, 1980).
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gled out. Apartment owners would point out that although their
conversion of apartment buildings into condominiums would not
help alleviate the rental housing shortage, a developer who builds
condominiums on unimproved land does not help alleviate the
shortage either, yet he is not forbidden to market his units. In
other words, the moratorium requires would-be converters to re-
main rental apartment landlords, so it must similarly require those
who develop multi-family housing on unimproved land to market
them as apartments or not at all. This argument cannot stand. Al-
though the choice to build a condominium instead of an apartment
building does not help alleviate the rental housing shortage, it does
not add to the crisis. When a conversion occurs, there is a double
negative impact. Existing rental housing is taken off the market,
thereby decreasing the supply, while simultaneously tenants from
the converted apartment who cannot afford to buy their units must
seek housing, thereby increasing the demand for what few units
remain available for rental elsewhere.
Moreover, a state has discretion to decide which problems to
confront and is not required to give attention to all similar evils. 38
In Stone v. City of Maitland,'89 a zoning ordinance required 150
feet of frontage on each side of the street and a distance of 350
yards between proposed gasoline stations and any church, hospital,
school, library, stadium, arena, or other place of public assembly. A
property owner who wished to build a gas station challenged the
ordinance under the fourteenth amendment, arguing that other
businesses, such as drive-in restaurants, created similar traffic
problems, yet were exempt from similar regulation. The United
States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, upheld the ordinance, stat-
ing that as long as the regulation bears a rational relation to the
problem at hand, the ordinance should be upheld. Noting that the
equal protection clause imposes no requirement to correct all simi-
lar wrongs, the court said, "If the legislature senses an evil, it may
deal with it. At the same time it is under no compulsion to deal
with all other evils that are seen to be equally serious.'"10
In Grace v. Town of Brookline,"" the court rejected an equal
protection challenge to condominium conversion regulation,
stating:
138. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); State v. Champe, 373 So.
2d 874 (Fla. 1978).
139. 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971).
140. Id. at 88.
141. - Mass. -, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979).
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The record suggests that conversion of controlled units into con-
dominiums has been occurring with accelerating frequency. Con-
sequently, Brookline reasonably could have concluded that con-
dominium conversion posed a singular threat to the purpose of
rent control. There is no denial of equal protection because
Brookline chose to focus its response on that threat.'
In Rothner v. City of Chicago,48 an ordinance requiring auto-
matic sprinkler systems in nursing homes constructed with fire re-
sistant or non-combustible materials was sustained even though
the regulation did not apply to similarly-constructed hospitals, or-
phanages, homes for the aged, and the like. The court emphasized
that the legislature has broad discretion, and acknowledged that
special problems exist in nursing homes because they house people
who are both sick and elderly.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also has distin-
guished property classifications that appeared similarly situated
when it refused to invalidate an ordinance regulating rents and
evictions in mobile home parks even though the ordinance did not
regulate other rental housing. 144 Thus, it appears that regulation
affecting the convertibility of multi-family housing into condomini-
ums cannot be defeated on equal protection grounds.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
cently upheld a zoning statute despite a condominium developer's
claim that the regulation deprived him of four constitutional
rights. 5 The developer contended that the statute effected a tak-
ing of property without just compensation and denied him sub-
stantive due process, equal protection of the laws, and procedural
due process. The court rejected the developer's arguments and
went on to state a sweeping judicial policy concerning local land-
use regulation.
In the past century the nation has witnessed the rise and
decline of federal judicial protection of rights inhering in the
ownership of interests in real property. Today, the Supreme
Court affords state and local governments broad latitude in en-
acting and implementing legislation affecting the use of land.
Implicit in this deference is the recognition that land-use regula-
tion generally affects a broad spectrum of persons and social in-
terests, and that local political bodies are better able than fed-
142. Id. at -, 399 N.E.2d at 1047.
143. 66 Ill. App. 3d 428, 383 N.E.2d 1218 (1978).
144. Newell v. Rent Bd., __ Mass. __, 392 N.E.2d 837 (1979).
145. Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980).
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eral courts to assess the benefits and burdens of such legislation.
Thus, absent defects in the process of enacting the legislation, or
manifest irrationality in the results flowing from that process,
courts will uphold state and local land use regulations against
challenges based on federal constitutional grounds.' "
This policy reinforces the conclusion that the state's or local
area's decision on the nature of the problem and the appropriate
solution must be given great deference. A party opposing a regula-
tion will carry a tremendous burden in any attempt to invalidate a
land-use statute on an equal protection ground.
D. Impairment of Contract Rights
Opponents of moratoriums might argue that the regulation
impairs the obligation of contracts previously entered into between
developers and purchasers of future converted units. The Miami
Beach ordinance prevents the "selling [of] a unit previously occu-
pied as a rental as a condominium,"""' not only when developers
have not yet converted 14  to condominium, but even when they
have already sent the tenants notices of intent to convert and fixed
prices for the units. " These latter developers may have already
contracted with prospective purchasers, but are now forbidden
from concluding the sale.
The argument regarding impairment of contract is not new. In
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,1 50 the Supreme
Court examined a Minnesota statute that provided for a one-year
moratorium on mortgage foreclosures. The Court emphasized that
146. Id. at 697-98.
147. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 80-2197 § 3(c) (Feb. 20, 1980).
148. Section 2: Applicability
This ordinance applies to all owners of multi-family residential units which
owners have not done all of the following as of the date of passage of this
Ordinance:
A. Recorded a Declaration of Condominium in the Public Records
of Dade County in the manner provided by State law.
B. Filed with the State Division of Florida Land Sales and Condo-
miniums documents and items required by Florida Statute 718.502.
C. Mailed notices of intent to convert to all tenants by certified
mail.
D. Fixed prices for units.
E. Taken deposit for sale on at least one unit, and deposit same in
seller's or escrow bank account.
Id. at § 2.
149. Id.
150. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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during an emergency, contracts are subordinate to the proper exer-
cise of the police power. " '
Whatever doubt there may have been that the protective
power of the State, its police power, may be exercised-without
violating the true intent of the provision of the Federal Consti-
tution-in directly preventing the immediate and literal en-
forcement of contractual obligations, by a temporary and condi-
tional restraint, where vital public interests would otherwise
suffer, was removed by our decisions relating to the enforcement
of provisions of leases during a period of scarcity of housing.152
To support this proposition, the Court cited three cases in-
volving the constitutionality of statutory regulation of landlord
and tenant relationships. " In two of these cases,' 54 challenges
were made to the constitutionality of a New York statute that de-
prived landlords of all possessory remedies. The Court stated that
"the police power is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Gov-
ernment to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general
welfare of the people and is paramount to any rights under con-
tracts between individuals" 55 and that the legislature is not lim-
ited to preventing the enforcement of only those contracts which
are in and of themselves hostile to the public's well-being.'5  The
Court stressed, however, that the relief afforded by the statute was
temporary and conditional, and had been sustained because of the
housing emergency. 57
As applied to conversion moratoriums, the Court's analysis
seems to suggest that as long as a housing shortage is viewed as a
legitimate reason for the exercise of police power,'15  and as long as
151. See also Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978); Teleophase Soc'y,
Inc. v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 308 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
152. 290 U.S. at 440.
153. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922); Marcus Brown Holding
Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
154. 258 U.S. 242; 256 U.S. 170.
155. 290 U.S. at 437 (quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905)).
156. 290 U.S. at 438-39.
157. Id. at 441. In Home Building & Loan Association, the Court also noted that the
New York legislation provided reasonable compensation to the landlord during the period
he could not regain possession. The legislation obligated the tenants to pay an amount the
court "regards as fair and reasonable." Id. at 441, 442. The same provision could be made
for would-be converters of apartment buildings to condominiums. With rental housing so
scarce, tenants are even more motivated to pay their rent. Courts can be relatively sure that
apartment owners will continue to receive income from the apartment units during the mor-
atorium period.
158. See discussion of legitimate exercise of police power in the text accompanying
notes 98-100 supra.
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a moratorium has a temporal restriction, any resulting impairment
in contracts that results from the moratorium would not be a via-
ble basis for a constitutional challenge.
E. Conclusion of Constitutional Analysis
Although moratorium legislation might seem unpalatable to
those who cherish personal rights and freedoms, the proposed leg-
islation should nevertheless withstand constitutional challenges
grounded on denial of substantive due process, taking without just
compensation, unequal protection of the laws, and impairment of
contract.
IV. PRACTICALITY OF MORATORIUMS
Although a moratorium may be constitutional, it is debatable
whether it, rather than another measure, should be enacted. De-
spite the decreased number of licensed apartments and the in-
crease in conversions,159 the conversion of apartment buildings into
condominiums is merely the result of the underlying cause of Flor-
ida's housing problem. Conversions are merely a symptom of a
broader housing problem. 160 The underlying problem is a combina-
tion of two factors: an increased demand for condominiums among
those who can afford them for residences and investments, and a
decreased supply of new rental housing for those who cannot. Cur-
rent social and economic factors, as well as the present tax laws,
are encouraging condominium ownership while simultaneously dis-
couraging apartment construction. The moratorium would be a
tourniquet, not a cure.
The present high rate of inflation"' has increased the desire to
own a home, whether it be a house or a condominium, among
members of the public who are able to purchase. Increases in rent
have occurred frequently and without apparent limit,162 frustrating
and frightening renters. Housing costs can be stabilized by buying
a home that, once established, is not subject to increases. " The
high inflation rate has also encouraged renters who can afford to
159. REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
160. Id. at 2.
161. The Wall Street Journal reported an inflation rate of approximately 17%. Wall
St. J., Apr. 23, 1980, at 3, col. 3.
162. Most of Florida's 567,347 licensed apartments are not subject to rent control. FLA.
STAT. § 166.043 (1979).
163. This statement assumes a fixed rate mortgage. Variable rate mortgages are more
akin to rent in that allowance for changes in market rates is built into the loan agreement.
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purchase to seek the tax deductions that ownership of a home con-
fers, such as those for interest and real estate taxes." 4 A homeown-
er gets an immediate income tax benefit by taking the allowable
deductions and at the same time builds up equity that will give
him a return upon the sale of the home. Moreover, condominium
conversions have increased ibecause many people find the size of
condominiums especially attractive. Much of the present popula-
tion of Florida desires a unit smaller than the traditional home.
The two-person household has become increasingly common be-
cause of both the growing senior citizen population and the chang-
ing family structure.
Florida has had a tremendous influx of elderly persons during
the last decade. In 1970 the population of persons aged sixty-five
and older was estimated at 985,266.165 This segment of the popula-
tion increased to 1,603,000 by July 1979.160 This 62.7% increase
has placed a great number of people in the market for smaller
housing units. The number of two-person households has also in-
creased because of the nationwide change in family lifestyles. Peo-
ple are marrying at older ages and having fewer children than ever
before. 1 7 The singles' community has increased because of the
large number of marriages which end in divorce.' This results in
an increased demand for smaller units.
Condominiums are also desirable solely for, investment pur-
poses. Real estate in the United States is an especially attractive
investment to foreigners because of favorable tax treatment, the
devaluation of the dollar, and the relative stability of our govern-
ment. Foreigners choose to purchase condominiums because they
are easy to maintain, control, and market. 6 9 United States re-
sidents also choose condominium units as an inflation-hedging in-
vestment for these latter reasons. With such demand for condo-
minium units,170 developers are encouraged to place a greater
number of units on the market.
164. I.R.C. §§ 163-164.
165. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
No. 875, POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS 11, table 3 (1980).
166. Id. at table 1.
167. Miami Herald, Apr. 7, 1980, § D (Living Today), at 1, col. 3.
168. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF U.S., tables 48, 51 (1979).
169. Miami Herald, Mar. 28, 1980, § H (Home & Design), at 1, col. 1.
170. It was reported that when 100 rental units in Dade County were converted to con-
dominiums, buyers started lining up two days before the sales office opened. In another
Dade County development, 1,000 people reportedly lined up to purchase one of 200 availa-
ble units. Miami Herald, supra note 5, at 12.
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At the same time, apartment buildings seem to be ever less
attractive as profit-making ventures. Inflation makes constructing
and operating an apartment building risky. In 1979, construction
costs increased at a rate of 2% per month.1"' The price of general
items necessary to supply and maintain apartment buildings in-
creased 12.2% .7 2 Although rents increased 8.4% in 1979,' 73 many
renters do not have incomes that keep pace with inflation. Lessors
undoubtedly sense that there is a limit to what renters can pay. A
possible additional cost in the operation of an apartment building
is the landlord's potential liability for the criminal acts of third
persons. Landlords have been held liable in suits based on the the-
ories of tort and contract when tenants were attacked or raped in
their apartment buildings.
174
Present income tax laws also discourage developers from
building rental units as opposed to condominiums. Before the Tax
Reform Act of 1976,175 deductions for real estate interest and taxes
incurred during the construction period could be taken in a single
year. ' These large deductions provided a shelter for income de-
rived from other sources. This tax shelter advantage is somewhat
diluted today; deductions are now required to be capitalized and
amortized over a number of years.1 7 Until 1976, the amount of de-
preciation that was required to be recaptured upon sale or ex-
change of the property was reduced 1% for each month the prop-
erty was held over 100 months. 817  Today there is no such
reduction 179 and any gain on the sale of the property will be con-
sidered ordinary income to the extent that the depreciation taken
under an accelerated depreciation method1 80 is greater than that
allowed under the straight-line method. 8' As a result, the income
171. Result of 1980 market analysis to be published by Douglas Wiles, editor of Real
Estate Digest.
172. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, table
1, at 8 (Oct. 1979).
173. Id.
174. In tort, the landlord must protect tenants from reasonably foreseeable harm. A
contract theory requires the landlord to maintain the level of protection that existed when
the tenancy began. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Braitman v. Overlook Terr. Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975). See also Annot.,
43 A.L.R.3d 311 (1972).
175. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
176. I.R.C. §§ 163-164.
177. Id. § 189.
178. Id. § 1250 (1970) (amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 202).
179. Id. § 1250.
180. Id. § 167(b)(2)-(3).
181. Id. § 167(b)(1).
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tax advantages to developing and holding real estate have been se-
verely diminished.
Because conversions are not the cause, but merely a symptom,
of a general housing crisis, some contend that a moratorium on
conversions is not the proper governmental response. 182 Others
point out that mere talk of a moratorium may result in developers'
rushing conversion projects to completion before the legislation
can be enacted, thus lessening the impact of the legislation and
perhaps reducing the quality of the units. s In its study on condo-
minium conversions, the Division of Florida Land Sales and Con-
dominiums rejected the idea of a moratorium, concluding that it
would not solve the rental housing shortage, but rather, in all
probability, would worsen the situation. "
In fact, condominium conversions are applauded by some who
find benefits in them.1 85 One ostensible benefit to government is a
larger tax base. 86 As a general rule, the just value assessment for
the collective units of a condominium is greater than the value as-
sessment of the same building operated as an apartment house.
The increased assessment, however, does not necessarily net a
greater receipt of funds. To result in an economic benefit to the
government, the taxes collected must be greater than the home-
stead and real estate exemptions that will be claimed by the new
individual unit owners. Proponents of conversions also find an-
other benefit to society: "[Clonversion is a powerful tool for pre-
serving and rehabilitating housing that otherwise might slip into
decay and abandonment. '187
Given the promise of profit from turning apartments into con-
dominiums, caused by the large demand for condominium units,
and given the decreasing desirability of apartment-building owner-
ship, owners of apartment buildings will convert and sell. While
the market struggles to equalize the supply of and demand for con-
dominium units, the government's goal must be the protection of
renters who cannot afford to purchase their units and have no-
where else within the community to seek affordable rental housing.
Government can do this in either of two ways: It can place a mora-
182. Miami Herald, supra note 5.
183. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 118; Miami Herald, Feb. 14, 1980, § D (Neighbors),
at 2, col. 1; Miami Herald, Feb. 13, 1980, § B, at 2, col. 1.
184. REPORT, supra note 1, at 118-19.
185. Bus. WEEK, Feb. 18, 1980, at 90.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 95.
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torium on condominium conversions, thus allowing owners of cur-
rently unimproved land to reap the profits of condominium sales
and denying the same opportunity to owners of apartment build-
ings, or it can attach sufficient incentives (mainly, tax relief or re-
imbursement) to ownership of apartment buildings so that owners
of apartment buildings will choose not to convert. s18 The latter is
preferable to the former because, even seen in its worst light, the
latter solution spreads the cost of the imbalance in supply and de-
mand among the people of the state (or the nation, if the federal
government could be persuaded to help), rather than concentrating
the cost upon owners of apartment buildings.
188. The 1980 Report to Governor Graham recommends several types of legislation,
including local option incentives for apartment development, the establishment of a state
housing finance agency, and a state investment program to promote construction of rental
housing. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 94-117.
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